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Research note 
 
ARE JEWS MORE POLARISED IN THEIR 
SOCIAL ATTITUDES THAN NON-JEWS?  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE 1995 JPR 
STUDY  
 
Stephen H Miller  
 
Numerous studies have reported differences between the attitudes of 
Jews and non-Jews toward a range of social phenomena.1 This note 
addresses a more fundamental issue, namely whether Jews - in accordance 
with Jewish folklore, religious narratives and the tropes of Jewish humour 
- are more divergent in their attitudes and more likely to hold strong views 
across a wide variety of issues. 
To address this question empirically it is necessary to compare the 
distributions of opinion of Jewish and non-Jewish groups on attitudes that 
allow the respondent to choose between moderate or more extreme 
positions.  It is then possible to test the hypothesis that Jews – in this case 
British Jews - are prone to adopt stronger and/or more divergent positions 
than non-Jews. 
The 1995 Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) study of 2167 
British Jews provides a unique opportunity to make such a comparison 
because the survey incorporated questionnaire items taken from the 
national British Social Attitudes Study (BSA).2 Thus it is possible to 
compare the pattern of responses of a large sample of Jews and non-Jews 
to exactly the same social attitude items, and to examine the extent to 
which Jews, in comparison with non-Jews, adopt more extreme positions 
on those attitudes.   
Subsequent JPR surveys have not included questionnaire items 
matched to those included in the BSA study (and nor has any other British 
Jewish community survey) so this issue can only be investigated for 
British Jews using relatively old data.  However, unlike mean scores on an 
attitude scale, which will obviously change through time, a finding that 
one group shows more diversity in its views than another group is less 
likely to be time dependent; this is because such comparisons reflect 
group differences in cognitive style rather than specific views on a 
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substantive issue. Cognitive style is known to be an enduring and 
consistent feature of human performance.3 
 
Findings 
 
Most of the questionnaire items in the BSA survey invite respondents 
to express their opinions by selecting a position on a five-point Likert 
scale.  For example, in response to the statement “Many people who get 
social security don’t deserve any help” each respondent may select any 
one of the following options:- 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
     
 
Typically, the ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ options attract 
the smallest numbers of responses.  However, a population with strong or 
highly divergent attitudes would be expected to gravitate towards the 
extremes of the scale. 
Chart 1 shows the distribution of responses of the national BSA 
sample (1995) and those of the JPR sample to a statement on social 
welfare payments. Although the median scores on the 5-point attitude 
scale are almost identical (at 3.46 and 3.45 respectively), there are about 
10% fewer Jewish respondents in the central categories, and a 
corresponding increase in the proportion of Jews in the ‘strongly agree’ 
and ‘strongly disagree’ categories.  Indeed Jews are roughly twice as 
likely as non-Jews to strongly disagree with the statement on social 
security (15% vs 9%), and to strongly agree with it (7% vs 3%).  
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CHART 1:      Many people who get social security don't deserve any help 
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This single example is not sufficient to validate the central hypothesis. 
However, Table 1 below extends the analysis to fourteen relatively 
controversial items that allow a direct comparison between the BSA and 
JPR data. In all but one of these cases, the Jewish respondents exhibit a 
wider spread of attitudes (i.e. a higher variance) than their non-Jewish 
counterparts. 
These distributions are based on large sample sizes (2900+ in the BSA 
study and 2000+ in the JPR study) and the differences in spread (the F 
ratio4) are statistically significant in 11 of the 14 cases – and in only one 
case is the expected outcome in the reverse direction from that predicted. 
The finding of greater variance in the JPR responses over the 14 items 
taken as a whole is highly significant statistically (Mean F ratio = 1.23, SE 
of Mean = 0.045, p <0.0001).  
 
Competing explanations 
 
These findings support the hypothesis that Jews are more divergent in 
their social attitudes than their non-Jewish counterparts. There are, 
however, at least two alternative classes of explanation for the results that 
need to be considered:  
 
1) Socio-demographic: The JPR and BSA samples differ significantly 
with respect to (i) age and (ii) academic achievement.  With regard to age, 
the JPR sample is somewhat more aged than the general population. 
However, since older respondents are less prone to extreme attitudes than 
younger ones,5 this confounding factor cannot explain the greater spread 
of opinions in the JPR sample. 
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Table 1 
 
Attitude statement 
Spread 
(variance) 
JPR 
Spread 
(variance) 
BSA 
F ratio 
(JPR/BSA) 
P 
value 
Many people who get social security don’t 
deserve any help  
1.38 1.06 1.29 0.1% 
In this area most people could find a job if they 
really wanted to 
1.26 1.19 1.06 - 
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way 
or another 
1.28 1.13 1.13 1% 
If welfare benefits weren’t so generous people 
would learn to stand on their own two feet 
1.58 1.19 1.32 0.1% 
Censorship of films and magazines is 
necessary to uphold moral standards 
1.47 1.17 1.26 0.1% 
Formal exams are the best way of judging the 
ability of pupils in schools 
1.38 1.1 1.24 0.1% 
Schools should teach children to obey 
authority 
0.95 0.69 1.37 0.1% 
Young people today don’t have enough 
respect for traditional British values 
0.99 0.90 1.10 5% 
People who break the law should be given 
stiffer sentences 
1.06 0.69 1.55 0.1% 
The law should be obeyed even if a particular 
law is wrong 
1.16 1.05 1.11 5% 
For some crimes the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence 
2.38 1.71 1.40 0.1% 
A man’s job is to earn the money; a woman’s 
job is to look after the home and family  
1.33 1.31 1.02 - 
A job is all right but what most women really 
want is a home and children 
1.22 1.27 0.96 R 
Ordinary working people do not get their fair 
share of the nations wealth  
1.07 0.80 1.40 0.1% 
  
With regard to academic achievement, in keeping with Census data 
for the period,6 the JPR sample contains a much higher proportion of 
graduates than the BSA sample (32% vs 10%). Since the variance of 
graduates’ attitudes is about 8% higher than that of non-graduates (in the 
JPR sample), the larger proportion of graduates in the JPR sample could 
explain the differences in variance between the two samples. However, 
making the crude, but plausible assumption that the BSA sample has a 
‘graduate effect’ of similar magnitude to that found in the JPR sample, the 
higher proportion of Jewish graduates could only account for about a 2% 
difference in the variance of Jewish and non-Jewish attitudes (ie [0.32 – 
0.1] x 8%) assuming additivity of variances in the relevant 
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subpopulations.  The data in Table 1 show a mean increase in variance of 
23% making it very unlikely that that the differences in exposure to higher 
education could account for more than a small fraction of the increased 
divergence of Jewish attitudes. 
 
2) Language norms:  A second and more subtle explanation is that the 
greater use of the extremes of the attitude scale by Jewish respondents 
may reflect a superficial difference in the way Jews label their opinions; 
i.e. that they have a greater propensity for using the more extreme labels 
(e.g. strongly agree/disagree) to describe the same level of conviction as 
would be represented by the terms agree/disagree by non-Jews. On this 
model, Jews could be characterised as having a lower threshold for using 
polarised language, rather than being more diverse in the intensity of their 
attitudes and beliefs.    
This ‘language norms’ hypothesis was tested empirically by 
comparing the variance of JPR and BSA attitudes on questionnaire items 
that were judged by a panel of five observers to involve ‘less controversial 
moral, political or social issues than the items in Table 1’ (e.g. judgements 
of how much more or less government spending should be devoted to 
particular areas of the economy).  If the more divergent opinions of Jews 
were due simply to their tendency to use unequivocal language, then they 
would be expected to show more divergence than non-Jews both on 
controversial and on neutral items. However, if the increased divergence 
reflects real differences in conviction, then the greater variability should 
diminish or disappear when Jews are compared with non-Jews on more 
neutral items. For the eight items allocated to the ‘neutral set’, there was 
in fact no significant difference between the variances of the JPR and 
BSA responses. (Mean F ratio = 1.02, SE of Mean = 0.055, p > 0.1).   
This leads to the conclusion, having excluded the most obvious 
confounding factors, that at least in the JPR and BSA samples Jews are 
significantly more polarised in their views than non-Jews. 
It is not clear why this should be so.  Indeed, it has not been the 
fashion in Jewish social research to examine attitudinal or psychological 
differences between Jews and non-Jews, still less to consider possible 
explanations for such differences.7   
There is a class of explanations that connects Jewish firmness in 
matters of judgement and opinion to the process of cultural transmission; 
in essence, Jewish patterns of child rearing, socialisation and education 
are assumed to encourage the development of analytical thinking and the 
formation of unequivocal views. This is something that could be usefully 
examined both in relation to the current issue and as a means of 
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understanding the processes by which Jewish identity is transmitted across 
generations.   
In addition to environmental explanations, there is a great deal of 
evidence to show that individual differences in cognition, personality and 
behaviour can be explained by genetic factors; behavioural geneticists are 
agreed that variations in characteristics like intelligence and assertiveness 
reflect the interaction of genetic and environmental causative factors.8 If 
genetics is a factor in the higher levels of conviction of Jews than non-
Jews then the intriguing question is how the Jewish gene pool came to 
select for these particular aspects of cognitive style?  There are at least 
two possible classes of explanation (not mutually exclusive): the first is 
that over successive periods of persecution, pogrom and hostile attack, 
there was survival value in having the capacity to construe situations in 
stark terms and to take firm and decisive action. Thus by the normal 
processes of behavioural evolution, the surviving Jewish population 
would have the genetic correlates of decisiveness and firmness selectively 
reinforced.   
The second possibility is that in periods of relative peace and 
harmony, Jews with more compliant and flexible personalities would be 
able to assimilate more easily into the host society.  Given this tendency, 
the gene pool of the sub-population which remained Jewish would, by 
default, shift in the direction of firm-mindedness (Hypothesis A).  
However, it is possible to argue precisely the opposite case:  Formidable 
social and emotional pressures may be brought to bear on those choosing 
non-Jewish partners or disassociating from the Jewish community in other 
ways - so those who cease to identify as Jews may be expected to possess 
the highest levels of intellectual conviction and determination (Hypothesis 
B).  
Hypotheses A and B have interesting and contradictory implications. 
They lead respectively to the prediction that the divergence of Jewish 
opinions will intensify further through time (A) or gradually atrophy (B).  
Using the JPR data it is possible to test whether Jews who have married 
out, or whose lifestyle can be characterised as tending towards 
assimilation, are more (or less) extreme than other Jews in their social 
attitudes.  Using the set of attitude items listed in Table 1 extended with a 
set of four similar items, outmarried Jews do exhibit more divergent 
attitudes than those who marry Jews or remain single, in accordance with 
Hypothesis B. (Mean F ratio = 1.12, SE of Mean = 0.022, p < 0.01%).   
If replicated in other studies, the conclusion to be drawn is that, in 
parallel with the process of assimilation, there is likely to be a net loss of 
individuals from the organised community who possess relatively diverse 
social attitudes. Over a number of generations, if these trends are reliable 
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and continue, the residual Jewish population which is currently 
characterised as having strong and divergent opinions, may come to lose 
that feature. 
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